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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND WORLD
PEACE A CRITIQUE OF THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS COVENANT
By HUGH McKINNON, WOOD*

A

RTICLE 8 of the Dedaration which was signed at sea on August 14, 1941, by President Roosevelt and 3\r. Churchill and
is known as the Atlantic Charter, contemplates disarmament of
aggressor nations "pending the establishment of aw der and pcrinanent system of security." Although the phrase is deliberately
vague, it is plain that the two statesmen did not look forward to
any fundamental change such as would result from federation on
a world scale, but had in mind some form of organization to provide security to the individual state in a 'world composed, as at
present, of independent states. There can be little doubt that this
is a correct diagnosis of the problem which will confront the
United Nations if they are in a position to enforce their views at
the end of the war, It will be a question of -doing again, and doing
better, what was attempted in the Covenant of the League of
Nations.
The machinery set up by the Covenant is in essentials simple.
The League is an example of the type of organization which states
naturally adopt when they form themselves into a permanent coinbination for common purposes. The tvo necessary organs of such
a combination are a standing conference of representatives of the
members and a permanent staff. The political character of the
League led to the conference assuming two forms. There is the
Assembly, whid is the general meeting of all the members, and
there is the Council which consists of a permanent element, namely
all the Great Powers belonging to the League, and a transitory
element in the shape of other Powers elected by the Assembly.
Except as otherwise provided, the Assembly and the Council
have legally equal and concurrent authority to act for the League,
but the interests of the states without seats on the Council are
safeguarded by the provision that they shall be invited to join the
Council when matters specially affecting their interests are tinder
consideration, and an interesting constitutional development has
*Barrister (Inner Temple) Counsellor of the Legal Section of the
Secretariat of the League of Nations from 1920 to 1940.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

differentiated the functions of the two bodies so that, roughly
speaking, the Assembly has assumed the right and final decision of
all matters of concern to the whole League while the Council, in
addition to preparing business for the Assembly and carrying out
tho policies decided by it, has come to be important chiefly as the
body which deals with international disputes and crises as they
arise and discharges the permanent political tasks which are entrusted to the League. The Secretariat is a corps of long-service
international officials, chosen so as to be as far as possible representative of all the members and pledged to obedience to the
League. The structure is completed by a multifarious system of
standing and temporary commissions or committees, and by the
appointment of commissioners for special tasks. Finally the operation of the whole imposing organization is subject to the traditional
rule of diplomatic conferences, that decisions shall be taken by
unanimity, a rule which is normally adopted in unions of states
for common purposes. The rule applies only to the Assembly and
the Council, not to the bodies which they may set up, but the
relevant article of the Covenant permits no derogation unless there
is an "express provision" to that effect or the question is one of
procedure. Moreover, with two exceptions which will be mentioned later (articles 15 and 16), the matters in which the Covenant
authorizes some form of majority decision are all matters relating
to the internal affairs of the League itself. The result is not an
international authority or form of government, not a tribunal for
the settlement of disputes, but an association of states. pledged
to abstain from war with one another unless and until certain prescribed methods of dealing with their disputes have been tried and
failed, pledged to apply in accordance with those methods all the
influence they can exert to settle or neuralize disputes, and pledged
in the last resort to come to the rescue of any of their number
which become victims of unlawful war. To this primary function
the Covenant adds other functions, political and non-political, and
it gives the League a competence sufficiently wide to embrace any
form of political or non-political cooperation between nations for
which the members may agree to use it. Given such agreement
the League can concentrate for the approQed -ends whatever resources the governments place at its dfsposal.
There seems to be no reason why the United Nations should
depart from this simple and familiar pattern of organization, which
is consistent with stiffening up or relaxing'the obligations of meii-
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bership and with increasing, as may be thought wise, the powers
of the organs of the association. The Council, in particular, has
thoroughly justified its existence. A smaller body than a general
meeting of all the states of the world is essential for dealing with
crises and it is essential that in it should be concentrated the authority of the major Powers. It is also very important that the
institution which deals with disputes and war should be at the
same time the central institution for international cooperation, not
only because the experience and equipment which it acquires in
this capacity will be directly serviceable for the performance of its
political task but above all in order that it may provide the organization through which can be gradually developed the more
rational and equitable regulation of international economic relations which is increasingly recognized to be a necessary basis of
permanent security. Accordingly in this article it will be assumed
that the new system of security will take the form either of a revised and reformed League of Nations or of a new institution of
the same general type. The object will be to examine what changes
in the present Covenant (articles 10 to 17 and 19) would be most
likely to make what I shall venture to call the "new League" an
effective organization for the defense of its members against aggression.
The problem falls naturally into two parts, the prevention of
war and collective action to deal with war if it occurs. For the
first purpose the Covenant employs what may be described as the
"conference method," coupled with strict obligations limiting the
right to go to war. Taking for granted the impossibility of setting
up an organization which will decide international disputes and
enforce its decisions, it relies on the many influences favorable to
peace which come into operation if a dispute, crisis or situation
dangerous to peace can be removed from the sphere of mere controversy between the parties and transferred to the relatively calm
and public atmosphere of.an international conference. The Council or Assembly serves as the forum for this purpose. The method
has its analogy in the domestic field in the submission of labor
disputes-which, like disputes between nations, are not capable
of settlement by authority-to conferences between employers,
labor and government officials representing the community at
large. Its application to international relations was not, of course,
new An attempt to make it a permanent part of the peace settlement after the Napoleonic wars was made by article VI of the
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Quadruple Alliance between Great Britain, France, Russia and
Prussia, but it broke down with the failure of the Conference of
Verona in 1822. In the hundred years from 1815 to 1914 the
method was successfully used on numerous occasions by the Great
Powers of Europe, the European Concert, which not merely employed it to settle the respective claims of the Powers, big and
small, but also sometimes intervened forcibly in favor of the settlements thus reached. Of their activities the English historian,
C. R. M. F Crutwell has written'
"An examination of the century 1815-1914 certainly justifies
although unable to prethe claim that the Concert of Europe
vent major wars did very valuable work, often unappreciated or
forgotten, in initiating or imposing solutions for difficulties which
if left to themselves, would have led to wars capable of producing
a general conflagration. Doubtless the arrangements made were
often based rather on expediency than on justice, and involved the
exercise of coercion more or less veiled. Yet it is obviously preferable that pressure, if it must come, should be collective rather than
individual in its origin. The Great Powers, while by no means a
disinterested or impartial body, aimed at preserving the peace of
Europe by methods which were far from being exclusively cynical.
It is indeed largely due to their efforts that the sphere of peaceful
change was so largely extended during the nineteenth century"
It was the conviction of Sir Edward Grey, the British Minister
for Foreign Affairs of 1914, that the world war of 1914-1918
would have been prevented if an institution had existed which
could have obligated Germany to come to the conference which he
unsuccessfully attempted to convene, for she would have seen at
once that Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia would be against
her (Burton J. Hendrick, "The Life and Letters of Walter H.
Page," Vol. II, p. 163)
Articles 12 to 16 of the Covenant, whose application to nonmember states is attempted in article 17, are inspired by this experience. Their operation is familiar the obligation to refer disputes to the League, if they are likely to lead to a rupture, unless
submission to arbitration or an international court is preferred,
the moratorium on war until the results of the course which has
been taken are known and there has been an interval for reflection,
the thorough investigation of the case and the painstaking endeavor
to obtain a settlement by agreement, the ultimate adoption, if this
endeavor fails, of recommendations for a settlement which if voted
by a mere majority have only a moral value but if they attain a
:'n his "History of Peaceful Change in the Modern World," p. 17

INTERNATIONAL ORGA4NIZATION

prescribed degree of unammity2 make war unlawful against the
party which complies with them and entitle it, if it is attacked, to
receive immediate assistance in the form of action against the aggressor by the other League members.3 With these articles should
be grouped article 11, paragraph 2, which greatly extends the
field of operation of the method by giving each League member
the right to bring to the League's attention any circumstances affecting peace, whether the member be concerned or not and with,out it being necessary to allege the existence of a dispute. It is
true that, owing to the omission to provide for not counting the
votes of parties, this paragraph does not authorize the adption of
recommendations against the votes of the parties, but the possibility of starting proceedings under article 15 is always present. In
practice the making of formal recommendations has usually marked
the failure of the conference method to reconcile the parties and its
importance has lain in the claim to-protecton which it gives the
state which complies with the recommendations and in the inducement to come to an agreement which its existence offers to a party
which is afraid of the recommendations which -are likely -to be
made.

J

The Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations are
of course very different from the pre-League conferences of the
Powers, which were attended only by, the representatives of the
Great Powers and such other Powers as they chose to have present, and which in the main served as a means of enabling the
Great Powers to agree upon the arrangements which ought to be
made and induce the others to accept them. Whether it was the
Council or the Assembly which acted, governments which have
referred a dispute to the League have had to deal with a body
whose attitude was conditioned by the fact that it was a permanent
body, one of the supreme organs of a world association of states,
and that its behavior in the particular case would be a precedent
of importance for the League and every member of it. A sense of
collective responsibility was thus engendered in the delegates and
the obligation to seek a settlement which would be fair to the
2
In the Council there must be a vote which is unanimous except for tile
votes of the parties, in the Assembly one which comprises all the votes cast
by the Council members and a majority of those of other League members,
disregarding the parties in both cases. The authors of the Covenant correctly
assumed that the general interest in the maintenance of peace would be likely
to make this degree of unanimity attainable.
3Compliance with an arbitral or judicial decision has the same effect but
disputes which are bona fide submitted to such a process of settlement are
not disputes which lead to war.
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parties and creditable to the League was taken seriously Indeed
one of the most remarkable and encouraging features of the
League's work was the conscientious and patient labor which not
only ambassadors and officials but also the foreign ministers and
other leading statesmen of the League countries would devote
through long meetings and over long periods to this often ungrateful and sometimes hopeless task. They were assisted by the fact
that they 'were accustomed to work together, since the laudable
practice of the governments was to send the same representatives
for periods of years at a time. They were also greatly helped by
having at their disposal an experienced permanent staff and other
facilities which no specially convened conference could command.
Further safeguards for the parties lay in the precise definition of
the League's duties and powers which is given in the Covenant
and the elaborate rules of procedure adopted by the Assembly and
Council. Finally the parties could rely on the presence in both
Assembly and Council of a certain number 'of Powers not affected
by the issues at stake but strongly interested in avoiding any step
which might create a dangerous precedent. The smaller states,
in particular, -were constantly on their guard against the Great
Powers and watchful to prevent any weakening of the principles of
international law on which they considered their own safety and
independence to be founded. In short a League inquiry was conducted with a high degree of impartiality, not merely as regards its
methods, i.e., such a matter as appointing neutral delegates to
take charge of the case as reporters (rapporteurs), but also in its
spirit and aim, and although it is doubtless true that nothing could
be done against the will of the more powerful members, the institution did not lend itself to utilization by those members for purely
selfish objects.
Indeed the question, is rather whether the fears of the beneficiaries of the peace treaties lest the status quo as established by
those instruments should be endangered, and the natural legalism
of. the smaller states, did not force too legalistic an attitude upon
the League and whether the safeguards against the exercise of
pressure upon League members through the League do not go too
far. Certainly the tendency of the Covenant as a whole is too conservative. It opens with a preamble which couples "maintenance of
justice" with "scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations" as a
means of "achieving international peace and security" In article
10 we have an obligation to "respect and preserve against external
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aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all the members of the League." Can the Assembly and the
Council in these circumstances properly recommend any change
in territorial or treaty settlements, or must they forever regard
them as sacrosanct? If the latter is the right answer, does not
article 16 bind every League member to defend by sanctions the
status quo of 1920? Even the appearance of stabilizing the situation existing at a particular date is dangerous for a "permanent
system of security." The status quo as by law established can no
more be unalterable among states than it can be unalterable within
the state itself among. groups or classes--employers and labor,
for example, or voters and non-voters--whose interests conflict
and whose importance and strength change in relation to one another. Too firm resistance to inevitable change means war in the
one sphere, revolution or civil war in the other.
This conservative tendency is not sufficiently corrected by
article 19 which authorizes the Assembly to recommend League
members to consider the advisability of peacefully altering conditions dangerous to peace, but leaves the states affected with a veto
on any resolution in this sense which may be proposed.
A further defect of the whole system, as the Assembly early
realized, is that it treats war as simply the result of failure to
settle a bona fide dispute, whereas too often there is a dispute only
in the sense in which there was one between the lamb and the
wolf in the fable. Some provision for intervening to protect the
victim of aggression before war actually breaks out would be
desirable. If the votes of the parties could be disregarded, it could
be found in article 11, particularly the first paragraph which makes
even a threat of war an occasion which calls for the League taking
"any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard
the peace of nations" or in article 10 which directs the Council
to "advise upon the means" by which the League members are
to implement the guarantees of the article. There has always been
a tendency among delegates and the Secretariat to argue that in
such provisions the obvious intention should on general legal
principles be interpreted as making it right not to count the
parties' votes, but the contrary view prevailed in practice and the
eloquent language of the articles cannot be regarded as depriving
the parties of their veto.
During the first fifteen or sixteen years of its existence the value
of the League method was demonstrated by a series of successes,
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both in dealing with critical situations and in contributing to the
reconstruction of Europe (Austria, Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria,
Estonia, Danzig), and where it failed, it at least enabled the
grievances of the parties to be ventilated. The fact that many of
the results achieved related to situations which have been swept
away by the onslaught of the Axis Powers does not dimmish the
service thus rendered to the maintenance of peace. So effective4
were the results of League treatment of the frontier disputes
and other crises which sprang directly from the peace settlement
that in 1925 the present writer was told by the Secretary General,
Sir Eric Drummond, that he considered the League to have for
the time being practically finished its political work except for
permanent functions such as minorities protection and mandates.
In 1928 the writer took an opportunity of asking Lord Cushendun,
a prominent English conservative politician who was then UnderSecretary for Foreign Affairs, what the latter really thought of the
League's political activities. Lord Cushendun replied that the business of the Foreign Office had never been so easy to conduct and
that he attributed this to the League.
Let us turn to the second part of the problem, that is to say
collective action against states unlawfully resorting to war. What
is the value of the League's equipment for this purpose?
So soon as there is any outbreak of war contrary to the provisions of articles 12, 13 or 15, article 16 requires each and all of
the League members to proceed immediately to isolate the offender
from all intercourse with themselves and all other countries,
whether belonging to the League or not, and the Council must
make recommendations as to the contingents which each is to
contribute to the armed forces which are to be used against the
offender. It is left to the conscience of each member to decide
whether there has really been a breach of the Covenant. The
offender remains a member of the League, unless it is expelled by
a unanimous vote of the Council, for which purpose its own vbte
does not count. There is no provision contemplating that the
League as an institution will examine whether there has been a
breach of the Covenant, or that it will organize the measures to be
taken, but it was from the outset recognized that this would be
necessary
It is not surprising that the spontaneous levee en masse to
which the League members are thus committed should have been
a failure. What is surprising is that so unprecedented a defensive
4

1t is not suggested that they were ideal.
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alliance could be created without more discussion of its difficulties.
Its first official sponsors, the British Foreign Office committee
known as the Phillimore Committee which in the early part of
1918 drew up the first draft of the Covenant, were a cautious
body; but there is no sign in their report that they saw any diffi-ulty in article 16. They describe the article as the "sanction" of
their system and confidently observe.
"We have desired to make it as weighty as possible. We have,
therefore. made it autonomous and automatic, and one to which
each state must contribute its force without waiting for the others,
but we have recognized that some states may not be able to make,
at any rate in certain cases, an effective contribution of military or
naval force. We have, accordingly, provided that such states shall
at least take the financial, economic and other measures indicated
in the article."
At the Peace Conference the article was redrafted, and an unsuccessful proposal for an international army was made by France,
but no one seems'to have asked whether the obligations of the
article would really be carried out. And yet the article was based
upon a most daring assumption.
This assumption was that all the forty-seven states which were
to be the original members of the League-and eventually all the
states in the world-could be trusted to hold themselves constantly
in readiness to come to the rescue of any of their number. To
appreciate how daring this assumption was, one must realize, that
what is involved is readiness of all the governments to expose
their populations to the incalculable strains, risks and losses of
involvement in war. The test which article 16 has to pass is successful application to a strong, aggressive and well-prepared state
or combination of states, and, once committed to war, such an
adversary is unlikely to yield to anything except defeat by arms,
and will not refrain from attacking loyal League members for the
mere reason that they are confining themselves to economic pressure. At the same time the article makes no allowance for the
obvious fact that the ways in which particular states will regard
any particular outbreak of hostilities, the direct effects which the
war will have upon tiem, and the losses and risks which they will
incur by intervening, are bound to be very different according to
the distance which separates them from the aggressor, their capacity
for defense and attack, the nature of their foreign trading and
financial relations, and other circumstances, Furthermore the article
gives no right to examine whether intervention is likely to succeed.
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Its operation, as the Phillimore Committee. pomted out, is automatic so soon as the breach of the Covenant occurs. It calls for
universal disregard of all the considerations which naturally influence states when they are confronted with a war in which they
are not engaged.
Iti s not practical politics to expect fidelity to a treaty obligation
to produce such results. One is tempted to suggest that the acceptance of the article in its present shape was due to a false
analogy, a kind of anthropomorphism applied to the state. It treats
states as though they formed a primitive community which had
advanced far enough to develop in its members a sense of interdependence which would make them combine for mutual defense
against invaders from without and criminals within. One thiks
of a savage or -of pioneers settling in unexplored territory The
members of such a group do feel that "peace is indivisible" and
see their individual interest in defending every member of the
community But such a picture is quite unlike the relations which
have always prevailed between states, which have been relations of
competition and contest, with war in the background as the ultimate instrument of national policy
A statS moreover cannot safely be credited with either the
capacity for disinterested action or the capacity for consistent
action which belong to a human being. Existing to promote the
welfare of the population, its government would be false to its
trust if it risked the safety of the state from altruistic motives.
On the other hand, consistency of behavior in matters which are
not controlled by long established tradition or force of circumstances, such as geographical situation, cannot be counted upon
in an entity whose internal life is one of constant struggle between
the rival forces which seek to control it. At any moment a change
in the balance of these forces and resulting change in the government, or even in the form of government, may profoundly modify
the state's foreign policy During the twenty years of its active
existence the League of Nations saw itself repudiated by the
United States, the chief author of its being, British policy vacillate
between scepticism and extravagant belief in its principles, France
pass from a policy of paramountcy in Europe to what was almost
one of peace at any price, Italy and Germany transformed from
liberal democracies to totalitarian dictatorships. In both these
respects article 16 asks too much from the League members.
The history of article 16 confirms the theoretical objections to
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which it is open. The first reaction of the League Assembly to the
withdrawal of the United States was the adoption in 1920-1921
of recommendations which emphasized the right of each member
to judge for itself whether there had been an unlawful resort to
wvar, and which called for the exercise of cautious pressure of
progressively increasing severity rather than the sudden crushing
blow which the article contemplates. Tlis stage was followed by
the search for security, as the necessary preliminary to reduction
of armaments, and during this period the article became the starting point for a number of abortive schemes of mutual assistance,
the most important being the 1924 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and the later proposal to make
every war which would be unlawful under the Kellogg Pact also
unlawful under the Covenant. An unhappy flavor of unreality,
not to say insincerity, attached to all these discussions owing to
the fact that they inevitably turned upon article 16. No government dared to repudiate the article and governments wich felt
the need of protection could not resist the temptation to seek at
least a diplomatic success by insisting on the sanctity of the obligations of the article, and trying to extend its scope. Yet at the
same time, it was notorious that few delegates or governments
failed to make mental reservations as to the possibility of their
countries being able to carry out the full obligations of the article or
felt much confidence in other countries doing so. The test of practice
came with the Japanese attack on China from September, 1931,
onwards. In the absence of a lead from Great Britain or France,
no action under the article was ever contemplated. Then on October 3, 1935, Italy flagrantly violated the Covenant by invading
Ethiopia and a timid experiment in the application of article 16
was at last made.
The situation was unfavorable for such action. Germany under
Hitler was already dangerous, and no one wanted to force Italy
into her arms. But there was a general feeling that it would be
impossible to take article 16 seriously again, if nothing was done.
Experts thought the conquest of Ethiopia would be a lengthy and
difficult business, and the idea arose that a modest amount of economic pressure should suffice to divert Italy from her enterprise,
without alienating her from the League or her former allies. In
these circumstances the British government, under strong pressure
from British public opinion but seemingly against its better judgment and despite the reluctance of the French government and a
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powerful section of French opinion, took the lead and sanctions
were applied. Italy throughout remained a member of the League
and took part in all its other proceedings.
Such measures as were adopted were decided upon with remarkable rapidity Within sixteen days from the beginning of the
invasion a "co-ordination committee" of representatives of the
members of the League had submitted to the governments four
proposals for sanctions 1) an embargo on the supply of arms to
Italy, 2) certain financial sanctions, 3) refusal to allow certain
imports from Italy, 4) refusal to allow certain exports to Italy
On October 31 it was possible to announce that, although Austria,
Hungary, Albania and Paraguay had from the outset refused to
take action, fifty League members were applying.or had proinlsed
to apply proposal No. 1) and forty-nine proposal No. 2), and that
forty-nine replies had been received showing proposals 3) and 4)
to have "met with very extensive agreement." The execution of
the proposals was however not so prompt and before all the
governments which accepted them had taken action the war ended
on May 2, 1936, with the flight of the Emperor from Ethiopia. On
July 4, 1936, it was decided to abandon. the sanctions. Some twentyfive per cent of the League members, including Italy's neighbor
Switzerland and most of the Latin American countries, did not
apply the more important sanctions at all.' This fiasco was a death
blow to the hope that reliance could be placed on article 16 and at
the Assembly of 1938 the article was for practical purposes abandoned in favor of the view that what could be done in case of
aggression must depend upon the circumstances of the case.
Nevertheless the above history is not wholly discouraging. The
original acceptance of article 16, the energy devoted to the search
for security, even the final episode, show that iodern nations do
not as a whole acquiesce in the view that war must simply be accepted as an unavoidable sociological phenomenon, and that they
are anxious to find an effective way of combining to prevent it.
The Ethiopian affair, although not an application of article 16, was
an example of disinterested action on behalf of peace, and, whether
the material cost was great or small, the political sacrifice which
was risked and incurred was nothing less than the formation of
the Axis and consequent upsetting of the balance of power.
Suggestions may now be offered for making the Covenant
effective as the charter of an organization for security The ly5Martelli, "Italy AgainSt the World," pp. 159-161 (Harcourt, Brace and
Company).
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pothesis adopted, namely that the organization must be a new
League, i.e., a grouping of independent states and not a form of
world government, rules out proposals which are impracticable
without the existence of a strong executive to enforce the decisions
of the organs of the community, and makes it unnecessary to
discuss such popular ideas as a League arny, decision of all disputes by the League, absolute prevention of war by the League. In
planning to maintain the peace among the essentially self-regarding
and unstable entities which we have seen modern states to be, the
basis upon which we have to build is the sentiment against war
which created the present League and is still increasing in strength
and the fact that in increasing measure, as war grows more unversally destructive, the great majority of' states are finding that
they have an interest in exerting themselves to prevent it, however
much particular states at particular times may see their advantage
in attacking their neighbors. The aim must be to create a structure of obligations, and institutions which will develop and bring
into operation the potential balance of power in favor of peace
which these circumstances will create, without seeking to bind the
members of the organization to more than they are able sincerely
to pledge themselves to perform. It must be recoguized that an
essential condition for success is the existence of a nucleus of
powerful members determined to maintain the peace, such as we
may hope will emerge from the present war, and that success on
every occasion cannot be guaranteed.
The ground would be cleared by,abolishing the guarantees of
territory and political independence contained in article 10. Instead
of guaranteeing the status quo, the new League would have the
duty of examining all cases in which members exercise the
"friendly right" of calling attention to circumstances, whether
affecting them or not, which they regarded as dangerous to peace.
Such circumstances would include the obsolescent treaties and the
dangerous conditions with which the present article 19 purports
to deal and this article too would disappear. The new article would
be the basis for League treatment of emergencies not brought before it as disputes, and for League action in favor of making by
peaceful means such adjustments in the international situation as
proved justifiable in the interest of peaceful relations between the
various states. When satisfied of the need for its intervention the
new League would have the right to order inquiries, which the
country concerned would be bound to facilitate, and to make such
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recommendations as it might consider proper. Although such
recommendations would in themselves have no legal effect, the
power of making them would be a valuable means of pressure, for
they would both express publicly the sense of the international
community and show what would be the result of bringing the
issues before the League as a dispute. At the same time the recoimendations might facilitate concessions since it is easier to yield to
the wishes of the community than to the demands of an opponent.
These provisions and those which follow are to be understood
as subject to a new rule of voting according to which a) the votes
of parties would always be disregarded, b) the other states would
decide by a majority which states were parties and c) any inquiry
could be ordered by a majority
There would follow articles obliging the League members to
submit to it disputes which were likely to lead to a rupture, if
they did not refer them to arbitration or judicial settlement. Only
a few changes would be made in the existing system. The moratorium on war would be extended to cover preparations for war,
and the League would be empowered to request the parties to
abstain from measures prejudicial to the claims or security of the
other party and -withdraw measures of this kind taken after the
submission of the dispute to the League.
We are thus led to the most difficult problem, that of collective
action in case of unlawful war. Article 16 must be replaced by
something more realistic and supple. I think the most that should
be attempted is to impose on the League fie duty of examining
each case and taking the measure which it deems wise and effectual,
leaving each member to decide what part it will play but requiring
each not to ,obstruct the measures taken, and recognizing frankly
that there may be cases in which it would be better for the
threatened state to make sacrifices than to rely on League assistance.
On the other hand the provisions for collective intervention
should apply to cases where an unlawful war is threatened. In the
Ethiopian affair the proper time for intervention was while Italy
was shipping her forces to Africa.
In view of these considerations I would propose to substitute
for article 16 a series of provisions to the following effect
a) Not only any war begun in violation of the Covenant but
also any circumstance indicating that there is danger of such a
war, including preparation for war after a dispute had been re-
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ferred to arbitration or the League, would be declared to be the
concern of the League, whose duty it would be to take whatever
action it might deem wise and effectual for safeguarding or for
restoring and maintaining peace.
b) 'The League would at once tender its good offices and at the
same time .consider whether and in what form it would recommend
intervention.
c) Intervention might be by any form of pressure, rising to
the full blast of economic measures, and measures of war, which
is contemplated by the present article 16.
d) The minimum obligation of the individual League member
would be to accept the measures taken as legitimate, whatever their
effect upon it, and not to claim neutral rights against members
applying measures of war to the covenant-breaker.
e) The intervention would be organized and the date at which
it should cease would be decided by the League.
f) Agreements between League members fixing the amount of
help to be given to any one of them on whose behalf intervention
took place would be allowed.
g) It is undesirable to expel the covenant-breaker from the
League. because it will be difficult for it to return. At the same
time it is absurd and inconvenient that the covenant-breaker should
continue to take part in the League's work. It would be better that
the recommendation of intervention against a state should automatically suspend its rights of membership. During the period of
suspension it should be debarred from resigning from the League.
The question whether under the suggested system decisions
should be taken unanimously, save for the parties, or by some
prescribed majority, is a difficult one. I doubt if majority decision
would be acceptable to the governments for all purposes, although
the unanimity rule lends itself to obstruction by satellites of the
parties. I am inclined to propose unanimity for the adoption of
reports and recommendations on disputes, since here it is less
difficult not to support a friend, and it is important that the moral
authority of the proposals should be as great as possible. For
other purposes a three-quarters majority would be sufficient, provided that not more than one of the permanent members of the
Council, i.e. the major Powers, had voted against the resolution.
Questions of procedure, as hitherto, would be settled by a bare
majority.
For wars which are not unlawful it is, I think, only possible
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to require the League to stand ready to use its good offices in
arranging a settlement when opportunity occurs.
Wars between members and non-members and between two
non-members would be dealt with in a new article 17, which would
give the League a certain discretion as to taking up the case.
I With such equipment I believe the new League would be able
to do anything that was politically practicable to prevent war and
defend its loyal members, and would be in a better position to
develop collective security than was the present League with its
armament of automatic obligations. The system may be criticized
as reactionary because admittedly it gives less protection to the
smaller Powers and greater freedom of action to the major Powers
than the existing Covenant. I regard this as essential. One cannot,
of course, expect the major Powers to be guided by pure altruism,
or to be incapable of sacrificing the interests of other states where
their own interests are involved. They are no more altruistic than
other states, although they may perhaps claim that the wider range
of their power and interests gives them a greater sense of responsibility But they possess the capacity for the effective action which
is necessary to make the system work, and they must be induced
and enabled to assume the burden of doing so. As a matter of fact,
the necessity of working through the Council or the Assembly
will be a serious check upon ill behavior by the major Powers. If
the experience of the past twenty years is any guide, there is as
much risk of lack of energy as of unfair or violent action on their
part.
To show how the system would work in detail a new version
of articles 11, 12, 13, 15, 16 and 17 of the Covenant is appended.
It contains some omissions and changes not discussed in the
article.
DRAFT kRTICLES
ARTICLE

A

1. Each member of the League has the right to bring to the attention of the Assembly or the Council without incurring any
imputation of unfriendly conduct, any circumstance, whether directly concerning the member or not, which affects international
relations and threatens to disturb peace or the good understanding
between nations upon which peace depends. Among such circumstances are included treaties which appear to require reconsideration and situations whose continuation might endanger peace. If
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the Council is seized of the case, all the League members shall
be immediately notified. The Council may at any time refer the
case to the Assembly, and it shall be bound to do so at the request
of any League member, if the request is made within (thirty)
days from the submission of the case to the Council.
2. The Assembly or the Council shall take the case under consideration and may make any recommendations which are considered -wise and appropriate.
3. The parties, that is to say the states directly concerned with
the case which is before the League, shall furnish any information
and evidence requested by the Assembly or the Council, and each
party shall give all necessary facilities for any inquiry ordered by
either of these bodies in any place within the jurisdiction of such
party
ARTICLFE B
1. The members of the League agree that if there should arise
between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will
submit such dispute to arbitration or the Permanent Court of
International Justice or other form of judicial settlement, as may
be agreed between them or provided by treaty, or else will submit
it to inquiry by the Council which shall report thereon in accordance with article D.
2. They further agree
i) Not to resort to war until their respective claims have been
dealt with in accordance with paragraph I above, and
ii) Not to resort to war, or make any preparations for war,
until (six) months have elapsed from the date of communication
to them of the arbitral or judicial decision or the Council's report;
and
iii) Not to resort to war at all against a party to the dispute
which complies with the arbitral or judicial decision or with the
recommendations of a report of, the Council which is unanimous
within the meaning of article D.
ARTICLE C

1. The-members of the League recognize the obligation to carry
out in full good faith all arbitral and judicial decisions.
2. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if
established would constitute a breach of any international obliga-
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tion, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made
for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are
generally suitable for arbitration or judicial settlement.
ARTICLE

D

1. Submission of a dispute to the Council under article B may
be effected by either party by a notification to the Secretary
General.
2. The parties shall communicate to the Secretary General, as
promptly as possible, statements of their cases with all relevant
facts and documents. They shall furnish any additional information
and evidence requested by the Council, and shall give all necessary
facilities for any inquiry ordered by the Council in any place
within their jurisdiction.
3. The Council shall inquire into the dispute and endeavor to
effect a settlement. If it succeeds, a statement shall be published
giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the
terms of settlement as the Council deems appropriate.
4. If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unaiimously or by a majority shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper for its solution. The report
shall be made within (eighteen) months of the submission of the
dispute to the Council, unless the Council unanimously considers
more time to be necessary
5. The Council may at any time refer the dispute to the Assembly, and it shall be bound to do so at the request of a party, if the
request is made within (thirty) days from the submission of the
dispute. The Assembly shall thereupon exercise all the powers and
be given all the facilities which the Council can exercise or demand
under this article, and its report shall have the same force and
effect for the purposes of article B, paragraph 2, as' a unanimous
report of the Council, if it ig adopted by a majority in which are
included all the votes cast by members of the Council and a majority of those cast by other members of the League.
ARTICLE

E

1. Any war which is begun in violation of article B, and any
circumstance indicating that there is a danger of the outbreak of
such a war, including preparation for war contrary to article B,
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paragraph 2, shall be a matter of concern to the League, and the
League shall take whatever action may be deemed wise and
effectual to safeguard or restore and maintain peace.
2. With this object
i) The Council shall at once place its good offices at the disposal of the states involved in the war or danger of war, which
are hereafter called the parties,
ii) The Council may at any time and from time to time recommend the members of the League to take appropriate measures,
including intervention by interruption of econ6mic, financial and
other relations between League members and non-member states
and the party or parties indicated by the Council, and intervention
by force of arms,
iii) The Council shall decide when the measures recommended
by it shall cease.
3. The members of the League undertake that they will to the
best of their ability participate and support one another in taking
the measures recommended by the Council. They accept in advance
as legitimate all steps taken by other members in execution of the
recommendations and, in particular, if unable themselves to take
part -in an intervention by force of arms, they renounce all right to
be treated as neutrals by the members which are intervening in this
manner.
4. So soon as measures have been recommended under paragraph 2, subsection ii), the Council may set up a committee of
representatives of the League members, other than the member or
members against which the measures are to be directed, and may
delegate to this committee the function of determining the exact
scope of the measures and co-ordinating their application.
5. The Council may at any time refer the case to the Assembly.
The Assembly shall thereupon exercise all the powers which can
be exercised by the Council under this article, and its recommendations shall have the same force and effect as recommendations of
the Council.
6. A (three-quarters) 'majority shall suffice for the adoption of
decisions under the present article, provided that not more than
one permanent member of the Council has voted against them.
7 It shall be permissible for members of the League to enter
into engagements with one another fixing the support to be given
by each to any of their number on whose behalf intervention is
recommended.
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ARTICLE F
1. The adoption under article E of a recommendation for action
against a League member on the ground that it has resorted to
war, or is preparing to resort to war, contrary to its obligations
under article B, shall suspend that member's rights of membership
until it is reinstated therein by a unanimous vote of the Council
or a three-quarters majority vote of the Assembly
2. During the period of suspension the member cannot validly
give notice of withdrawal from the League.
ARTICLE G

1. If there should arise between a League member and a nonmember state a dispute likely to lead to a rupture, or any other
circumstance indicating a danger of war being made upon the
member by the non-member, the latter state shall, if the member
so request, be invited by the Council to accept the rights and obligations of membership of the League for the purposes of the
particular case. If the non-member accepts the invitation, the provisions of articles B, C, D, E and H shall be applied as though
both states were members of the League.
2. If the non-member refuses the invitation and resorts to war
against the member, the provisions of article E shall be applied
against the non-member state.
3. The Council, if it thinks fit to do so, may invite any nonmember states between which a rupture of relations or outbreak of
war appears likely to occur, to accept the rights and obligations of
League membership for the purpose of the particular case. If all
the states accept the invitation, the provisions of articles B, C, D,
E and H shall be applied as though they were members of the
League.
ARTICLE H11

1. Where war has broken out between League members before
action has been taken under article D, the Council may treat that
article as applicable notwithstanding the outbreak of war, if it considers it desirable to do so. It shall have the same discretion as
regards article G in a case where war occurs between a League
6

The desirability of some such provision as this article is suggested by
the Chaco war, between Bolivia and Paraguay, in which the League was
asked to apply article 15 after the parties had been at war, contrary to the
Covenant, for a considerable period.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

63

member and a non-member or between two non-members before
the article has been applied.
2. In all cases of war which have-not involved a breach of the
Covenant, whether the parties are members of the League or not,
the League shall at all times be ready to use its good offices for the
reestablishment of peace.
ARTICLE I

In all proceedings under articles A, D, E, G and H
i) The votes of parties shall not be taken into account,
ii) Any-question as to which states are parties shall be decided
by a majority, the votes of the states in regard to wIch the question is raised being disregarded,
iii) All questions relating to the obtaining of information and
the holding of inquiries shall be treated as questions of procedure
(i.e. be decided by a majority).

